On p. 3 of his response Rabbi Shapiro differs with my interpretation of the Meiri’s opinion that women may not recite the Berakhot connected with Keriat ha-Torah. I wrote that, “women may not be the agent for men to fulfill their obligation of these Berakhot”. Rabbi Shapiro says that I am reading into the text “for others”, words which are not there.

Indeed the Meiri does not state that the issue is fulfilling the obligations of others to hear the Berakhot. However, nor does he state that the issue is reciting Berakhot for the voluntary performance of Mitzvot from which they are exempt. The Meiri does not spell out the problem with woman’s reciting a Berakhah on something she is exempt from. Therefore, his reasoning can only be inferred from other sources, if at all. In several places he cites both views concerning whether a woman can recite a Berakhah when performing a mitsvah she is not obligated to perform; see for instance his commentary to Rosh Hashanah, 33a. In his commentary to Hagigah 16b, he seems to prefer the view that a woman may recite a Berakhah. It is therefore not likely that he would prohibit a woman from saying Birkhot ha-Torah on the grounds that she is exempt from this Mitzvah.

The passage from the Meiri’s commentary to Megillah 24a, quoted by Rabbi Shapiro on p. 7 of his article and referred to in page 3 of his response, that concerning Keri’at Hatorah, unlike other Mitzvot, it is not necessary to have someone who is himself obligated fulfill the obligation on behalf of others, talks about minors, but not about women. The Meiri, in his commentary to Megillah 23a, immediately following his statement about women, states that a minor may recite the Berakhah. Clearly the Meiri distinguishes between women and minors on this matter. Therefore, the passage from Megilla 24a about minors is not relevant to the passage on 23a about women.

The consideration I mentioned, that of fulfilling the obligation for others, is mentioned in the Ran to the passage in Megilla 23a (13a in the Rif pages, s.v. hakol). True the Ran lived after the Meiri and the Meiri cannot quote the Ran. However, the factor mentioned in the Ran is a plausible explanation of the Meiri. The factor mentioned by Rabbi Shapiro, making a Berakhah on a Mitzvah from which she is exempt, is, I believe, not plausible. Therefore, the Meiri’s view cannot be rejected on the assumption that he assumes that “women may never recite blessings when performing mitsvot from which they are exempt” (p. 3 of Rabbi Shapiro’s response).

In p. 6 of his article Rabbi Shapiro says the Rema and Taz to OH 135:14 explain the reluctance to remove a Sefer Torah from the synagogue for the benefit of an individual who is sick or in prison “in order to avoid the appearance that qeri’at ha-Torah may take place privately.” This latter consideration is not mentioned in the Rema or the Taz. Nor is it a plausible explanation of their position.

The Yerushalmi Yoma 7,1;44a asks why on Yom Kippur a Sefer Tora is brought to the Kohen Gadol; why doesn’t the Kohen Gadol go to the Sefer Torah. The Gemara answers that exceptions are made for important people; in the case of important people, it is not dishonorable to bring the Sefer Torah to them. Based on this passage, the Mordechai to Rosh Hashanah, #710, says it is forbidden to bring a Sefer Torah to prisoners. Bringing a Sefer Torah to a person, rather than the reverse, is a violation of the Torah’s honor, even in the case of prisoners who are unable to go to the Sefer Tora. The Maharam Of Padua, in Teshuva #88, says that when the Sefer Torah is placed in an ark and stored for a day or two in the new location, as opposed to being brought just for the occasion of the reading, it is not considered a violation of the Torah’s honor. The Rema cites this Halakhah and the Taz explains that when the Sefer Torah is placed in ark it is as though the ark is the where the Sefer Torah usually belongs; it is not considered as having been brought to specific people specially for the reading.

The issue under consideration here is the dishonor of bringing a Sefer Torah to a person, instead of the person’s coming to the Sefer Torah. The issue Rabbi Shapiro mentions, “in order to avoid the appearance that qeri’at ha-Torah may take place privately”, is not the issue under discussion here or to my knowledge anywhere else.

Rabbi Shapiro, in note 78 of his article, states the Shulhan Arukh does not accept the opinion of Rabbi Jonah that an Oleh who said the Berakhah silently has to repeat it. In my comments I noted that the Shulhan Arukh cites this view. To this Rabbi Shapiro explains that this view is prefaced in Shulhan Arukh by the phrase “yesh omrim” and, he adds, “the interpretative rule is that a yesh omrim position is not R. Yosef Karo’s own”. This interpretative rule is not correct yesh omrim. Most Aharonim assume that when R. Yosef Karo quotes a view prefaced by the phrase “” and he does not quote a contrary view, R. Yosef Karo accepts this view. The reason it is prefaced with “yesh omrim” is that it is mentioned explicitly only one of the earlier poskim; see Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, Yabia Omer II, OH, 4:3. In the case of reciting berakhot silently, no view contrary to that of Rabbi Jonah is cited and therefore it is to be assumed that R. Yosef Karo accepts the view of Rabbi Jonah.

Rabbi Shapiro, in p. 13 of his article, interprets a passage of the Meiri, in his commentary to Berakhot 47b, as saying that women can be counted towards the quorum of ten for Keri’at ha-Torah. In my comments I differed with that interpretation of the Meiri; Rabbi Shapiro, in his response stands by his interpretation. I believe that even based on this passage alone, that my interpretation is more likely. In any case, in another passage, which I was not aware of when I wrote my earlier comments, the Meiri says explicitly that women may not be counted toward the Minyan for Keri’at Ha-torah; see Kiryat Sefer, ed. R. Moshe Hirschler, Jerusalem 5716, p. 89.